Determination of Controlling Shareholders’ Liability and Institutional Constraints in Corporate Governance
公司治理中控股股东责任的认定与制度约束研究

摘要

股权集中结构下，控股股东能够凭借表决权、董事提名权及经营决策影响力深度参与公司治理，其控 制权在提高决策效率的同时，也可能形成资金占用、利益输送、不当关联交易及干预经营等风险。现行公司 法已经从股东权利滥用、关联关系利用、忠实勤勉义务和指示侵权等方面强化控股股东责任。责任认定应突 破形式持股比例判断，以实质控制、利益冲突、损害结果及因果关系为核心，并通过关联交易审查、内部治理、 中小股东救济及多层次追责形成与控制权相匹配的制度约束。

Abstract

Under a concentrated ownership structure, controlling shareholders can participate extensively in corporate governance through voting rights, director nomination rights, and influence over business decision-making. While such control may enhance decision-making efficiency, it may also give rise to risks including misappropriation of corporate funds, tunneling, improper related-party transactions, and undue interference in business operations. The current Company Law has strengthened the responsibilities of controlling shareholders with respect to abuse of shareholder rights, misuse of affiliated relationships, duties of loyalty and diligence, and tort liability arising from instructions. The determination of liability should go beyond a formal assessment based solely on shareholding ratios and instead focus on substantive control, conflicts of interest, actual damage, and causation. Institutional constraints commensurate with the exercise of control should be established through related-party transaction review, internal governance mechanisms, remedies for minority shareholders, and multi-level accountability.